A Barren Harvest for the Developing World? Presidential  Trade Promotion Authority  and the Unfulfilled Promise of Agriculture Negotiations in the Doha Round by Johnson, Clete D.
NOTES
A BARREN HARVEST FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD?
PRESIDENTIAL "TRADE PROMOTION AuTHoRrrY" AND THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE
DOHA ROUND
Clete D. Johnson*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 438
1. CONTEXT: PROMISE, CRITICISM, PRAISE, AND COLLAPSE ........ 441
m. THE POLITICS AND PROMISE OF TPA ........................ 446
IV. THE FARM BILL AND THE U.S. AGRICULTURE PROPOSAL ........ 454
V. THE DOHA ROUND AND U.S. AGRICULTURE EXPORTS .......... 464
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................... 471
* J.D., 2004, University of Georgia School of Law; M.Sc., International Relations, 2001,
London School of Economics; B.A., American History, 1996, Harvard University.
437
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
I. INTRODUCTION
The "Trade Promotion Authority" (TPA)' that Congress granted the
president in the Trade Act of 20022 could allow him to leave a mark on
international affairs that, in the long term, might rival the significance of the
"war on terrorism."3  The successful conclusion of the Doha Round of
comprehensive multilateral trade negotiations-begun in November 2001 in
Doha, Qatar with the primary goal of further integrating developing countries
into the global economy4-would have far-reaching implications not only for
developing countries, but also for how the people of those countries view the
industrialized world in general, and the United States in particular. This Note
will demonstrate that the success of the Doha Round will turn on the presi-
dent's use of this TPA and on his success in following the export-oriented
guidance given by Congress when it granted him this authority.
Further, this Note will argue that the language pertaining to agriculture in
the Trade Act of 2002 is the fulcrum of the Doha Round. The success or
failure of the Doha Round depends on the success or failure of the agriculture
negotiations, which are "the centrepiece"' of the Round. The agriculture
negotiations themselves pit the United States against the European Union and
Japan in a geopolitical struggle to gain the support of developing countries.6
Because its export-oriented agriculture interests coincide with those of
developing countries, the United States has, or at least once had, the upper
hand in this courtship ritual.
The U.S. advantage in this struggle is captured explicitly in the language
of the Trade Act of 2002, by which Congress delegated to the president the
1 Trade Promotion Authority is the new name the Bush Administration has given the
constitutional device formerly known as "fast-track authority." TPA allows the president to
complete international trade agreements and submit them to Congress for a yes-or-no vote
without any amendments. See infra notes 8 and 52 and accompanying text.
2 Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933.
See, e.g., Tom Friedman, Connect the Dots, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 25,2003, at A26 (calling
the September 2003 collapse of the Doha Round negotiations in Cancun a "disaster" for U.S.
global leadership, including U.S. efforts to combat terrorism).
" Ministerial Declaration of the Doha WTO Ministerial 2001, adopted November 14, 2001,
available at http://www.wto.org/englishthewto-ehminisLte/minOle/mindecl-e.htm [hereinafter
Doha Declaration]. The Doha Round is the first attempt at comprehensive global international
trade negotiations since the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in 1994.
' See Europe's Meagre Harvest, ECONOMIST, Jan. 25, 2003, at 70.
6 See infra Part V.
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authority to negotiate trade agreements.7 Trade Promotion Authority is an
innovative constitutional device that allows the president to present to
Congress a completed trade agreement for a yes-or-no vote, without the
possibility of amendment.' TPA is indispensable for the completion of
complex multilateral trade talks such as those in the Doha Round.9 Further,
this partial delegation of Congress' power to "regulate Commerce with foreign
nations"'  comes with direct and explicit instructions.
In the case of agriculture, these instructions are simple: Congress
commands the president to seek export opportunities for U.S. farmers. " This
Note will argue that this language is the key to the entire Doha Round; the
success or failure of the Round will hinge on whether the United States and its
trading partners in Europe, Japan, and the developing world can come to an
agreement that accommodates this congressional demand for international
agriculture markets favorable to U.S. exports.
Part 11 of this Note will provide a detailed contextual overview of the
agricultural negotiations in the Doha Round, from the November 2001 launch
in Doha through the September 2003 collapse in Cancun. The Note will then
present the above argument in an analysis that will consist of three sections.
Each section will analyze a different legal and political aspect of the agricul-
ture negotiations of the Doha Round, from constitutional to domestic to
international.
Part 11 will examine the history of presidential Trade Promotion
Authority.' 2 It will explore the conditions that led to its successive renewal
through two decades and five presidential administrations. Then it will look
at fast-track's most prominent hour during the approval of: (1) the Uruguay
Round of global trade negotiations, which created the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO),' 3 and (2) the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
which created a free trade area among the United States, Canada, and
Mexico.' 4 Next, this section will review the 1994 expiration of TPA
' Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933, Division B (Bipartisan Trade
Promotion Authority).
I See generally Michael A. Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast-Track: From Free
Trade to Beyond, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'LL. & ECON. 687 (1996).
' See infra Part III.
,0 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
, Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933.
2 TPA was formerly known as "fast-track authority." See supra note 1.
,3 See World Trade Organization, at http://www.wto.org.
'4 See The NAFTA Secretariat, at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org.
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immediately following those landmark accords and the Clinton Administra-
tion's subsequent failure to renew the authority. Finally, it will examine the
Bush Administration's eighteen-month fight for TPA and identify the key
conditions and concessions it had to make to narrowly gain passage. Part III
will conclude that had President Bush vetoed the vast subsidies of the Farm
Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (the Farm Bill)," Congress would
not have granted him TPA.
Part IV will examine the United States' agriculture proposal through the
lenses of the Farm Bill and the language of TPA. With the politics of the Farm
Bill and the Trade Act of 2002 in mind, this section will evaluate the Farm
Bill's compatibility with the U.S. agriculture proposal. In looking at the
synergy between the Farm Bill, the TPA language, and the U.S. agriculture
proposal, Part IV will conclude that the much-reviled Farm Bill can peacefully
coexist with the highly-praised U.S. agriculture proposal.
Part V will take a holistic view of the U.S. position on agriculture in the
Doha Round. First, it will demonstrate that of all the crucial issues of the
Round, agriculture is the sine qua non of the Doha Development Agenda.
Second, it will compare the initial U.S. agriculture proposal to those of Japan
and the European Union (EU), and it will detail the agreement between the
U.S. and the EU that led to the collapse of Doha Round negotiations at the
September 2003 Cancun ministerial meeting. Third, it will conclude that this
agreement failed to find sufficient consensus among other WTO members,
particularly the developing countries, because it strayed too far from the
export-oriented congressional guidance of the TPA legislation.
Finally, the Note's conclusion will synthesize the analysis into a simple
thesis: The language in the Trade Act of 2002 regarding TPA guidance on
agriculture negotiations is the key to the Doha Round, because its demand that
the president open agricultural export opportunities is in line with the interests
of a tremendous majority of WTO member countries. All of the issues
discussed in the three sections of the legal analysis collapse into one: the
importance of TPA language of the Trade Act of 2002. Therefore, if the major
players can reach a consensus on agriculture trade that comports with that
language, the Doha Round will be well on its way to success. If not, as now
seems possible given the September 2003 collapse of negotiations in Cancun,
the Round will fail.
" Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134
[hereinafter Farm Bill].
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II. CONTEXT: PROMISE, CRITICISM, PRAISE, AND COLLAPSE
The members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) launched the Doha
Round in November 2001 amidst grave global concern over the potentially
devastating effects the September 11 (9/11) attacks would have on interna-
tional trade and the world economy. Only two months after the attacks, the
prospects for trade liberalization at Doha were "a lone bright spot in a dark
world."' 6 This bright spot was a pleasant surprise. The previous biannual
meeting of WTO trade ministers, at Seattle in 1999, had also held the promise
of beginning a new round of multilateral negotiations, but it had deteriorated
before it could even begin. 7 The United States, the European Union, and the
collective group of developing country members could not agree on an agenda
for a new round, and this negotiating impasse quickly became an embarassing
debacle when the meeting was marred by violent protests from the anti-
globalization community. 8 The contrast with the failure in Seattle in 1999
accentuated the air of optimism coming out of Doha in 2001.
It also heightened the Bush Administration's sense of accomplishment:
"Doha wouldn't have happened if it weren't for the United States," crowed
U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick.19 The United States played an
important role in ensuring that the outlook of the Doha Round, captured in the
Doha Declaration, was particularly ambitious on the issue of agriculture:
"[W]e commit ourselves to comprehensive negotiations aimed at: substantial
improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all
forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting
domestic support."' Further, the interests of the developing countries were
made a central part of the Declaration:
We agree that special and differential treatment for developing
countries shall be an integral part of all elements of the negotia-
tions and shall be embodied in the schedules of concessions and
16 Trade Disputes: Dangerous Activities, ECONOMIST, May 9, 2002, at 63.
" See Clueless in Seattle, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 1999, at 17.
"Id.
19 Daniel Altman, Global Trade Looking Glass: Can the U.S. Have it Both Ways, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 9, 2002, at C1. THE ECONOMIST, writing nearly a year later in its August 1, 2003
issue, still agrees that "the Doha Round will not succeed without American leadership."
I Doha Declaration, supra note 4, art. 13.
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commitments ... [so as to] enable developing countries to
effectively take account of their development needs.2'
Zoellick argued that the United States had reassumed the mantle of leadership
in the international trade arena: "The debate is now over how (not whether) the
United States is advancing free trade."22
Agriculture is the central issue of the Doha Round,23 and the Bush
Administration initially felt it had the upper hand in the agriculture negotia-
tions. However, since this initial promise in the wake of the launch of the
Doha Round, the United States has had a hot-cold relationship with the
developing world. First, in May 2002, Congress passed, and President Bush
signed, the Farm Bill,' which sent shockwaves throughout the global
agriculture community.25 The legislation increased domestic subsidies for U.S.
agriculture by an estimated eighty percent.2" The Farm Bill dealt a devastating,
if self-inflicted, blow to America's claim to being the champion of agricultural
trade liberalization. "Seemingly overnight," wrote The New York Times, the
Farm Bill transformed U.S. farmers "from benevolent producers of the world's
greatest bounty to ... greedy welfare kings undermining poor farmers in
Africa, Latin America and Asia."27
Developing countries saw these new subsidies as "a declaration of war" and
as a betrayal of past promises from the United States to help developing
countries make the transition from protected economies to free trade.' There
were charges of hypocrisy; after pushing developing countries for years to seek
the benefits of trade liberalization, the U.S. had undermined these poor
countries' efforts by passing subsidies that would depress the commodity
prices on which these countries rely to realize the gains of trade. 'This is the
way of rich countries," says Prakam Virakul, the agricultural attach6 of the
21 Id.
I U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick (by invitation), Unleashing the Trade Winds,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 2002, at 27.
1 Europe's Meagre Harvest, supra note 5, at 70 (calling agriculture the "centrepiece" of the
Doha Round).
24 Farm Bill, supra note 15.
2 Elizabeth Becker, A New Villain in Free Trade: The Farmer on the Dole, N.Y. TImES,
Aug. 25, 2002, at Section 4-10.
' See US Farm Bill 2002: Its Implications for World Agricultural Markets, KISANWATCH,
at http://www.kisanwatch.org/englanalysis/may2OO21an-US-FARM-BILL-2002J.htm (last
visited Feb. 17, 2004).
27 Becker, supra note 25.
UId.
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Thai Embassy in Washington, D.C. "They tell us to open our markets; we do,
but they don't stop giving their farmers subsidies."'29
However, in July 2002, only two months after President Bush signed the
Farm Bill, the United States put forward an ambitious WTO agriculture
proposal that U.S. officials trumpeted as a brave first step toward meaningful
liberalization of global trade in agricultural products."° This proposal received
widespread praise from developing countries and countries that had been
critical of the Farm Bill. "The Government of Sri Lanka welcomes the
comprehensive U.S. proposal to reform global agriculture," Minister of
Economic ReformMilinda Moragoda said, adding that "agriculture is critically
important to the prosperity of developing countries and [to] the success of
WTO negotiations on the Doha Development Agenda. [Therefore] our
government looks forward to working with the United States in the WTO
negotiations to achieve the declared objectives."3
Other agriculture-exporting countries such as New Zealand and Australia
said the "bold [U.S. proposal is] to be applauded,"32 adding that it "clearly
demonstrates [the United States'] commitment to engage seriously"" in Doha
Round agriculture negotiations. The stance of these countries, which are
members of the "Cairns Group" of agriculture-exporting nations, 34 is of great
significance because their support for the U.S. proposal rounds out a
tremendous coalition of WTO-member nations that (like the United States)
wishes to use the Doha Round to effect substantial liberalization of global
agriculture markets.35
This initial U.S. proposal called for drastic reductions in agricultural tariffs
worldwide, the wholesale elimination of export subsidies, and huge reductions
29 Id.
3o See U.S. Proposal for Global Agricultural Trade Reform, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE FOREIGN AGRICULTURALSERVICE, at http:llwww.fas.usda.gov/itp/wtolproposal.
htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. Proposal].
31 What They're Saying about the U.S. Agriculture Proposal, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, at http://www.ustr.gov/new/agr-sayings.html (quoting Moragodaon July 25,
2002).
32 Id. (quoting New Zealand Minister of Agriculture Jim Sutton on July 26, 2002).
3 Id. (quoting Australian Trade Minister Mark Vaile on July 26, 2002).
3' The Cairns Group, founded in 1986, is a partnership of seventeen agricultural exporting
countries. Its membership consists of wealthy countries such as Australia, New Zealand and
Canada, as well as developing countries from Asia (e.g., Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines),
South America (e.g., Brazil and Uruguay), Central America (e.g., Costa Rica and Guatemala) and
Africa (e.g., South Africa). See The Cairns Group at http://www.cairnsgroup.org.
" See infra Part V.
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in trade-distorting domestic subsidies to farmers.36 If enacted as proposed, the
provisions of the U.S. proposal would indeed have brought about significant
liberalization of world agriculture markets. In particular, the proposals to
eliminate export subsidies and to slash domestic support would address many
of the complaints from the developing world about the heavy support wealthy
countries lavish on their agriculture industries. 3
However, critics in the EU and Japan, which protect their farmers with high
tariffs and heavy domestic and export subsidies, argue that because of the
social importance of viable rural farming communities, and the land use and
environmental issues that are inherent in farm policy, agriculture should be
treated with caution in global trade negotiations.38 Accordingly, they
complained that the U.S. proposal focused too much on cutting tariffs and
subsidies and not enough on preserving the environment and traditional rural
farming lifestyles.39 Moreover, they noted pointedly that the U.S. proposal put
most of the pain of agricultural liberalization on its trading partners (read: the
EU and Japan).' Because of this perceived imbalance, says EU Farm
Commissioner Franz Fischler, the U.S. proposal was "not a very good basis to
find a compromise in the negotiations.""' The proposal was unrealistic, the
argument goes, because it demanded so much of some countries and so little
of the United States.
After a year of international political posturing that followed the initial U.S.
agriculture proposal in July 2002, the United States and the EU finally found
common ground in a joint agriculture proposal in August 2003 that the two
trade powers hoped would pave the way for a successful conclusion of the
Doha Round. 2 To the contrary, though, because the agreement scaled back the
36 U.S. Proposal, supra note 30. See also infra Part IV.
3 Generally speaking, developing countries are not fiscally capable of supporting their
agricultural sectors with either export subsidies or domestic subsidies. See generally Peter
Lichtenbaum, "Special Treatment" vs. "Equal Participation ": Striking a Balance in the Doha
Negotiations, 17 AM. U. INT'LL. REv. 1003 (2002).
3 WTO Chair Cites Good Progress in Farm Trade Talks, BUREAu NAT'L AFF. TRADE
DAILY, Nov. 12,2002.
39 Id.
id. See also infra Part V.
'" U.S. Agriculture Proposal Receives Mixed Reviews, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG.,
Aug. 6. 2002, at http://www.ictsd.orgweekly/02-08-06/story5.htm.
42 Paul Meller, Deal Reached on Subsidies for Farmers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2003, at Al
(quoting trade lawyer Richard Weiner as saying, "Developing countries may criticize it, but the
two sides have now created the conditions needed for success in Cancun").
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ambition of the initial U.S. proposal significantly, 3 it lost the support of the
developing world. The result of this agreement between the U.S. and the EU
was the collapse of the Doha Round negotiations at the September 2003
Ministerial Meeting in Cancun." A coalition of over twenty developing
countries walked out of the talks, largely in protest of the perceived stubborn-
ness of the U.S. and the EU with regard to agriculture."
This Note argues that this collapse at Cancun was caused by the failure of
the United States to find an agreement that accomodates the TPA language of
the Trade Act of 2002. The following sections will demonstrate that for the
Bush Administration, the aim of both the Farm Bill and the initial agriculture
proposal was to toe the political line of the powerful domestic agriculture
interests. This political requirement is enshrined legally in the congressional
TPA guidance. The initial proposal aimed to secure for U.S. farmers gains in
export markets that would offset any losses they might suffer from potential
cuts in subsidies that could come during Doha Round negotiations. In the
words of one industry source, "They're going to have to convince [us] that
[we're] going to get a better return from the market than from the govern-
ment.,,6
Further, the initial proposal would have allowed farmers to reap a
substantial harvest from the government as well as from the market, because
it would have left most of the subsidy programs of the Farm Bill in place.
Still, it was possible that this glaring duplicity would not damage the prospects
of the U.S. agriculture proposal, because it enjoyed the support of most of the
membership of the WTO, except for the EU and Japan. The developing world
and the Cairns Group supported the initial U.S. proposal, which arose from the
guidance of TPA, even more strongly than they denounced the Farm Bill.
However, the collapse of negotiations in Cancun in September 2003
demonstrates that finding an agreement that accommodates the export-friendly
TPA language of the Trade Act of 2002 will be exceedingly difficult. The
initial U.S. proposal did accommodate this legal requirement, and even in light
of the hated Farm Bill, developing countries and the agriculture-exporting
countries of the Cairns Group still stood to gain more from the U.S. agriculture
proposal than from the proposals of the EU and Japan. However, upon scaling
" U.S., EU Offer Ag Negotiating Framework, WASH. TRADE DAILY, Aug. 14, 2003, at 1.
" Elizabeth Becker, Delegates from Poorer Nations Walk Out of World Trade Talks, N.Y.
TImES, Sept. 15, 2003, at Al.
45 id.
" U.S. Proposes to Cut Domestic Spending by $10 Billion, Reduce Ag Tariffs, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, July 26, 2002, at 1.
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back this proposal in its August 2003 compromise agreement with the EU, the
United States lost the support of the developing world, and the Doha Round
negotiations collapsed. It will take a reassertion of the export-oriented
principles of TPA for the Round to get back on track.
M. THE POLITICS AND PROMISE OF TPA
Constitutional scholar Harold Koh has noted that "[o]ne cannot read the
Constitution without being struck by its astonishing brevity regarding the
allocation of foreign affairs authority among the branches." '47 Because of this
"astonishing brevity," it has been said that the Constitution "is an invitation to
struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy." '48 However,
while vagueness and ambiguity may indeed characterize much of the Constitu-
tion's guidance on foreign affairs, the document could not possibly be more
clear and direct with regard to international trade: "The Congress shall have
Power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations." '49 According to the
U.S. Supreme Court, the "complete power of Congress over foreign com-
merce" is "exclusive and absolute."5 The Court continues, "the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations is expressly conferred upon Congress,
and, being an enumerated power, is complete in itself."'"
Trade Promotion Authority, however, delegates that "exclusive and
absolute" power. It transfers most of the trade-negotiating initiative from the
Congress to the president, giving the president the authority to negotiate and
conclude trade agreements that will be presented to Congress for a yes-or-no
vote with no amendments.52 This authority is indispensable in the multilateral
negotiations of the WTO; it is virtually inconceivable that Congress, a body
with 535 members, could successfully negotiate a comprehensive trade
agreement within the framework of the WTO, an organization with 146
member nations.53 The widely diverse interests that motivate the members of
47 HAROLD HoNGJu KOH, THE NATIONALSEcURrrYCONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAm 67 (1990).
48 EDwARDS. CORwiN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICEANDPOWERS 1787-1984 201 (Randall Bland
et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
So Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 493 (1904).
I1 d. at 492.
52 See generally Carrier, supra note 8.
" See Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewtole/whatise/tife/org6_e.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2004).
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Congress, and those that motivate the 145 other WTO member countries,
would inevitably erode any possible accord. Similarly, without TPA, any
agreement that the president might negotiate with other trading partners could
easily be torn apart bit-by-bit by myriad amendments proposed by individual
members of Congress. Accordingly, U.S. leadership-or even participa-
tion-in the Doha Round is not practically possible without presidential TPA.
Unfortunately for proponents of free trade, this presidential authority
invariably comes at a protectionist cost. Economist Fred Bergsten argues that
President Bush's signature on the protectionist Farm Bill in May 2002 was
only the most recent example of a long-standing presidential strategy to obtain
this authority: "Every president who has wanted to obtain the domestic
authority to conduct new international liberalizing negotiations has had to
make concessions to the chief protectionist interests of the day. The entire
history of U.S. post-war trade policy can be characterized as 'one step
backward, two steps forward.' "' According to Bergsten, this political game
is an inescapable part of a strategy in which the president trades small
protectionist measures for the TPA that will allow him to substantially
liberalize trade.55
Despite initial complaints from advocates of free trade, this approach has
succeeded in each of the three major episodes of post-war U.S. trade
policymaking. It gave rise to the Kennedy Round under Presidents Kennedy
and Johnson and the subsequent Tokyo Round under Presidents Nixon, Ford,
and Carter. Most recently, both the Uruguay Round and NAFTA were carried
out under Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton.56
"' C. Fred Bergsten, A Renaissance for U.S. Trade Policy?, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 2002,
at 92-93.
I d. at 94. Bergsten explains that in this two-part strategy, the President
successfully seeks international agreement to launch new negotiations. But
he is blocked from obtaining the necessary domestic authority by the
protectionist interests of the day. He thus has no choice but to placate those
interests sufficiently to neutralize their opposition to his proposed negotia-
tions. With those interests assuaged, Congress provides the needed authority.
The president then completes the international negotiations. He essentially
trades protection that is modest and temporary ... for liberalization and
international rule-making that is sizable and permanent.
Id.
56 Id. at 90. In the wake of World War II, when the foundations of today's international
economic system were being built, President Harry Truman side-stepped aprotectionist Congress
to sign the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor of the WTO, as
an "executive agreement." The GATT never received congressional approval; indeed, despite
the explicit language of the Constitution granting Congress the power to "regulate Commerce
2004]
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President Kennedy sought congressional approval of the Trade Expansion
Act, which would allow him to launch the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade
negotiations, the "centerpiece of both his overall foreign policy ... and his
economic policy."5 Fearing that the legislation would be blocked by the
textile lobby, Kennedy "directed his administration to negotiate the first
comprehensive U.S. import quotas on cotton textiles, paving the way for more
than 40 years of extensive protection for that sector."58 With this move,
Kennedy gained the support of the textile industry for the proposed
legislation.59
President Nixon followed a similar strategy a decade later. 'To combat the
first widespread surge of postwar protectionism and pave the way for Congress
to approve the launch of the Tokyo Round in 1974.... Nixon had to go even
further than Kennedy did."' He expanded the protection of the cotton industry
to other areas of the textile and apparel industry.6 Later, President Carter
would have to protect the shoe, steel, and television industries in order to
maintain domestic support for the negotiations, and, eventually, to gain
congressional approval of the Tokyo Round.62
As the seminal Uruguay Round got underway in 1986, President Reagan
continued the trend. Because of huge trade deficits due to the over-valuation
of the dollar during his administration, Reagan (in the words of Treasury
Secretary James Baker) "granted more import relief to U.S. industry than any
of his predecessors in more than half a century." The Reagan Administration
tightened existing quotas on textiles and apparel even further, muscled its
trading partners into "voluntary export restraint" agreements on such items as
automobiles and steel, and "accepted the infamous 'Super 301' authority that
permitted retaliation against 'priority foreign countries' of whose trade policies
the United States disapproved."" These concessions to protectionist interests
with foreign nations," Congress was never consulted on the agreement that founded the modem
international trade system. John K. Setear, The President's Rational Choice of a Treaty's
Preratification Pathway: Article 11, Congressional-Executive Agreement, or Executive
Agreement?, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 5, 7 (2002).
' Bergsten, supra note 54, at 93.
58 Id.
59 Id.
0 Id.
61 Id.
6 id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 94.
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yielded congressional renewal of fast-track authority in 1988, which was
indispensable for the completion of the Uruguay Round, already underway.6"
Armed with fast-track authority, the Clinton Administration "enjoyed a
spectacular start on trade":(6
It completed the Uruguay Round in 1993 ... and won congressio-
nal approval for both [that] round and [NAFTA]. It launched the
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation initiative (APEC) aiming to achieve "free
and open trade and investment" in that huge and dynamic region
by 2010 or 2020.67
The Uruguay Round, which transformed the GATT into the WTO, was
completed and approved by Congress within a year of NAFTA. Together,
these two trade agreements brought revolutionary changes to U.S. and global
trade. Bergsten writes that President Clinton's first two years in office
"represented the zenith of post-war U.S. trade policy. '68
After these two landmark agreements, however, "the situation deteriorated
rapidly"'69 with the expiration of fast-track authority in June 1994. As Clinton
failed year after year to regain fast-track authority throughout the 1990's, little
progress was made with the FTAA or APEC, and the attempt to launch a new
round of multilateral WTO trade negotiations in Seattle in 1999 was a
spectacular failure."0 Also, efforts to come to bilateral free-trade agreements
with Jordan, Singapore, and Chile were left incomplete."
President George W. Bush faced a "Herculean task" in "regenerating U.S.
trade policy."72 The Doha Round and other trade negotiations high among the
Bush Administration's list of priorities, such as the proposed FTAA, assumed
even more importance after the attacks of 9/11. The attacks underscored the
urgency of positive engagement with the international community and with the
65 Id.
66 Id. at 88.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. See also Clueless in Seattle, supra note 17.
7' Bergsten, supra note 54, at 88. Bergsten asserts that even the free-trade successes of the
late Clinton years-permanent normal trade relations with China and significant trade
liberalization with Africa and the Caribbean-were "replete with limitations." Id.
72 Id. at 89.
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developing world in particular. Two months after the attacks, Bush's Trade
Representative, Robert Zoellick, went to Doha intent on launching a bold new
round of multilateral trade negotiations, and although the Bush Administration
went to Doha without TPA, the launch was a success. The trade officials of
the member countries of the WTO left Doha having agreed on an ambitious
agenda for the round of negotiations and agreed to a target date of January 1,
2005, for completion of the Round."
As described in Part II, most of the goodwill the Bush Administration had
gained in the international trade community from its key leadership role in
launching the Doha Development Round in November 2001 had thoroughly
dissipated by the spring of 2002. First, the United States became embroiled in
an ugly dispute with Canada over lumber imports." Then Bush gave in to
pressure from steel-producing states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West
Virginia, to impose thirty percent tariffs on imported steel. 5 Then came the
Farm Bill.
As explained above, the near-doubling of agriculture subsidies in the Farm
Bill shook the international trade community, particularly developing
countries, and called into question the United States' commitment to
liberalization of world agriculture markets. "The United States was very
supportive of some of the positions that those of us from the developing
countries took at Doha. What happened at Doha gave us hope that we could
work together," said Dr. Kofi Apraku, Ghana's Minister of Trade and
Industry. 6 The Farm Bill, though, caused Dr. Apraku's mood to change:
'There has been a lot of concern and a lot of worry in our country about the
United States' commitment to carry forward the momentum that was created
in Doha.""
Zoellick was dismissive of these complaints, saying that "many countries
had to stretch politically [at Doha] and then had to deal with sensitivities back
home." 8 In this view, the Farm Bill simply represents part of the political
" See Doha Declaration, supra note 4. Multilateral negotiations such as the Doha Round
invariably take years to complete. For instance, the Uruguay Round, which created the WTO,
was begun at Punta Del Este, Uruguay in 1986 and was completed in 1994. See What is the
WTO?, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-ewhatis-e/whatis-e.htm (last visited Mar. 4,
2004).
14 Bergsten, supra note 54, at 86.
75 Id.
76 Altman, supra note 19.
7 Id.
78 id.
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manuevering that takes place in the negotiation of agreements. "A pause for
repositioning," Zoellick said, "is understandable." For the Bush Administra-
tion, this "pause for repositioning" was not only understandable, but also
absolutely necessary-indeed, powerful political forces demanded this
"repositioning" for TPA to have any chance of passing.
Thus, the true impetus behind "America's farm idiocy," opined The
Economist at the time Bush signed the Farm Bill, "is electoral."'  The
Senators and Representatives from large farming states in the Midwest
initiated this legislation,8 and while Bush did not originally support it, he
apparently felt that vetoing the bill would be too politically risky. The power
of the farm lobbies in states such as Iowa, South Dakota, and Missouri were
too politically frightening for Bush to veto the bill.82
However, this Note contends that Bush's refusal to veto the bill was at least
in part a calculated political strategy centered around regaining TPA. In
addition to pandering for new Senate and House seats for Republicans in the
upcoming November elections (or even for electoral votes in the presidential
election of 2004), Bush gave in to the farm lobby's protectionist demands
specifically because of his desire to liberalize global trade, including
agriculture trade. TPA provides the explanation for this paradox of trade
liberalization through protectionism, writes The Economist: "Many Washing-
ton free-traders argue that all such protectionist measures have been a price
worth paying for the greater good of winning TPA. In politics, they argue, you
often have to take one step back to move two paces forward."83
This is precisely Bergsten's thesis,84 and the fast-moving developments in
trade diplomacy since Bush gained TPA illustrate the point well. As Zoellick
explains, TPA unlocked the door to dynamic "competitive liberalization": 5
In the 100 days since Congress granted the president fast-track
authority, the United States has completed the substance of [a
Free Trade Agreement (FTA)] with Singapore and started talks
for FTA's with the five nations of the Central American Eco-
nomic Community, the five countries of the Southern African
79 id.
8o Trade Disputes, supra note 16.
81 Id.
82 id.
83 Id.
84 See Bergsten, supra note 54.
85 Zoellick, supra note 22.
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Customs Union, Morocco, and Australia. We have almost
completed an FTA with Chile . . . [and have] helped push
forward the negotiations . . . for a Free-Trade Area of the
Americas. 6
TPA was the crucial condition for that significant trade negotiating activity.
"The alternative," writes Zoellick, "would have been a prolonged U.S. absence
from serious international trade negotiations. '"87
These strides forward toward liberalized trade, however, came at the cost
of what many consider several significant steps backward to protectionism: the
steel and lumber tariffs, and, of course, the Farm Bill. In Bergsten's opinion,
none of these [protectionist] steps is defensible on its merits. All
of them, in fact, represent extremely bad policies. Most of them
were directly related to electoral politics. But they were also
essential components of restoring an effective U.S. trade policy.
The entire strategy could not have even begun without congres-
sional passage of TPA .... Unsavory political bargains simply
had to be struck to get the basic approach off the ground."
Bergsten notes that Bush regained TPA by only "paper-thin majorities." 9
Indeed, this Note contends that had Bush vetoed the Farm Bill, his effort to
gain TPA would have failed. While the bill passed by the comfortable 64-34
margin in the relatively trade-friendly Senate, it barely passed in the House by
the slim margin of 215-212.' ° Absent the Administration's action to protect
the steel industry, and absent its acquiescence to the enormous increases in
agriculture subsidies contained in the Farm Bill, TPA likely would not have
had this three-vote victory in the House. Had only two Representatives voted
against the Trade Act of 2002, the bill would have failed by a vote of 213-214.
Of the 215 Representatives who voted for TPA, 127 had earlier voted for the
86 Id.
87 Bergsten, supra note 54, at 98.88 d. at 92.
89 Id. at 89.
90 Votes on Fast Track Trade Promotion Authority, 1974-2002, BRoOKINGS INSTITUTE, at
http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/comm/policybriefs/pb9 lFasttrack.htm (last visited Jan. 16,
2004). According to FIN. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 2002, at 14, Bush himself made a rare trip to Capitol
Hill to lobby for the bill and "stayed up six hours after his normal ten p.m. bedtime" to lobby
wavering Representatives.
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Farm Bill as well.9' If Bush had vetoed the Farm Bill in May 2002, it is nearly
certain that the powerful farm lobby could have pried away at least two votes
from among the 127 Representatives who voted for both the Farm Bill in May
and also for TPA in July. To put it simply, Congress would not have granted
Bush TPA if he had vetoed the Farm Bill.
If this theory is correct-that the Bush Administration's protectionist stance
on agriculture helped it gain TPA-then the crucial question is whether a
protectionism-tainted TPA will be useful for anything in the Doha Round,
given the importance of developing countries to the success of the negotia-
tions, and the importance of agriculture to the developing countries. "The
Doha agenda is based on a gamble: that poor countries, who felt they were
given a raw deal by the previous Uruguay Round... will now feel that rich
countries are prepared to open their markets. If poor countries are not
convinced of this, the Doha round will fail." '92
The export-oriented language of the TPA guidance from Congress is clear
on this issue, and it provides hope that the United States can gain the trust of
the developing world. Whether the subject is tariffs or subsidies, "the
principal negotiating objective of the United States with respect to agriculture
is to obtain competitive opportunities for United States exports of agricultural
commodities in foreign markets."93 On the issue of agriculture, perhaps the
crucial element of the Doha Round, the powerful U.S. farm lobby communi-
cated its desires clearly to its representatives in Congress. In turn, through the
explicit and implicit TPA language of the Trade Act of 2002, Congress has
given the president his marching orders for agriculture negotiations in the
Doha Round: promote export opportunities for U.S. farmers.
Trade Promotion Authority, then, is actually an export promotion
requirement. It is the U.S. farmers' good fortune that this goal also resonates
with the export-oriented interests of developing countries. What is good for
U.S. agricultural exports is good for those of developing countries as well.
"' From a comparison between the Final Vote Results for Roll Call 123 (Farm Bill), OFFICE
OFTHE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, at http://www.clerkweb.house.gov, and Final
Vote Results for Roll Call 370 (Trade Act of 2002), OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, at http://www.clerkweb.house.gov. Moreover, of the 127 Representatives
who voted "yea" on both bills, fourteen were Democrats who obviously owe no party allegiance
to President Bush. Id.
92 Trade Disputes, supra note 16.
" Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933, Division B (Bipartisan Trade
Promotion Authority).
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IV. THE FARM BILL AND THE INITIAL U.S. AGRICULTURE PROPOSAL
Unfortunately for proponents of agriculture trade liberalization, "agriculture
is an issue where people really dig their heels in."'  Policymakers should be
unapologetic in their protection of their countries' agriculture sectors, says
French Agriculture Minister Herv6 Gaymard, because "farmproducts are more
than marketable goods.""5 Unlike other sectors of the economy, farming plays
a unique role in a nation's culture because it is "literally rooted in the land:
farmers, unlike manufacturers, cannot simply switch from one location to
another."' Perhaps because of this peculiarity, agriculture has always been a
unique sector in international trade. Under the GATT, agriculture was given
exceptional treatment that left the sector virtually unregulated by the
international trade community, allowing governments to implement protection-
ist and mercantilist farm policies.97
The Agreement on Agriculture of the Uruguay Round, which finally
brought agriculture into the purview of the global trading system, established
"three pillars" of agricultural trade regulation: (1) export competition,98 which
involves government programs that promote a country's exports in interna-
tional markets; (2) market access," which refers to the tariffs and quotas that
determine a nation's level of acceptance of imports; and (3) domestic
support,"° which deals mostly with government subsidies for domestic
agriculture production.
This section will address each of these three pillars in great detail, because
the U.S. agriculture proposal calls for significant changes in all three. First,
though, it will focus on the third pillar, domestic support, because it is in this
field that the Farm Bill operates. During the Uruguay Round, the United States
was among the twenty-eight countries that agreed to cap their "aggregate
measurement of support" (AMS) at certain negotiated levels. 1' These ceilings
94 Harbinson Disappointed with Latest Round of WTOAg Talks, Promises Modalities Draft,
BUREAU NAT'L AFF. TRADE DAILY, Jan. 27, 2003, at A3.
" The Case for the Defence, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003, at 42.
% Id.
97 See Dale E. McNiel, Furthering the Reforms of Agricultural Policies in the Millennium
Round, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 41 (2000).
98 Agreement on Agriculture, art. 4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994).
Id. art. 6.
'00 id. art. 8.
'0' Aligning U.S. Farm Policy with World Trade Commitments, AGRICULTURAL OUT0OK,
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differ country-by-country, and the United States' agreed limit is $19 billion per
year.0 2 The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture categorizes domestic
support measures into three distinct "boxes": 03
* "Green box" supports. These subsidy programs are not tied to
(or in WTO-speak, are "decoupled" from) production or price
levels. Examples of "green box" supports include income
insurance and environmental payments, which do not distort
trade, or do so only minimally. This form of support, which the
United States gives lavishly, is exempt from a country's calcula-
tion of its AMS.'"
* "Blue box" supports. These subsidies actually limit production,
so they have a relatively benign trade-distorting effect. An
example of "blue box" support is direct payments to farmers to
let fields lie fallow. The United States presently makes no such
payments to U.S. farmers. These measures are also exempt from
inclusion in a country's AMS.'0 5
* "Amber box" supports. The "amber box" contains the support
measures tied to production or price levels that significantly
distort global trade in agriculture. The most familiar example of
"amber box" subsidies is price support programs, such as those
in the Farm Bill, that allow farmers to sell their crops at artifi-
cially low prices. These "amber box" subsidies constitute the
support that counts against a country's allowed AMS.'"
Under the "amber box" category of support, there are two significant loopholes
built into the agreement-termed "de minimis exemptions"'0 7 due to their
supposedly minimal effects-that governmental trade lawyers can use to
exclude certain subsidies from their nation's AMS calculation.
Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 12.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 id.
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The two de minimis exemptions are: (1) any product-specific support that
is less than five percent of the value of that particular product's total
production value, and (2) any non-product-specific support that is less than
five percent of the value of the country's total agricultural production."0 8 A
country's AMS is calculated, then, by adding all the "amber box" trade-
distorting support and then subtracting those programs that fall under one of
the two de minimis exemptions. Under the Agreement on Agriculture, the
United States is limited to $19 billion per year of "amber box" support, as
explained above."9
Each country must notify the WTO each year of its total AMS," 0 and, of
course, this total must be under that country's AMS ceiling to remain
compliant with the Agreement on Agriculture. Until recently, the United
States held the negotiating high ground among wealthy countries in this area.
First, the United States' AMS commitment to limit trade-distorting support to
a ceiling of $19 billion per year is substantially lower than the EC's limit of
$60 billion per year and Japan's limit of $30 billion."' Further, in the years
immediately following the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, the
United States' AMS was regularly well under its ceiling."'
The Freedom to Farm Act of 1996, the first major farm bill after the AMS
commitments of the Uruguay Round, significantly cut subsidies and began the
process of decoupling the remaining subsidies from production." 3 The
Freedom to Farm Act greatly reduced "amber box" subsidies to the point that
in 1998, the U.S. AMS totalled only $10.4 billion, about half of its allowable
support." 4 It was understood then in the international trade community that
these cuts were the first steps toward subsidy-free agriculture in the United
States.' This position gave the United States the support of developing
countries, and thus a sort of moral authority to push hard for cuts in the EU's
enormous agriculture subsidy program, the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP)," 6 as well as similar protectionist regimes in Japan and elsewhere.
0S Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
"' U.S. Proposal, supra note 30, at Domestic Support section.
22 Aligning U.S. Farm Policy with World Trade Commitments, supra note 101.
'3 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (Freedom to Farm Act), Pub.
L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat. 888.
124 Aligning U.S. Farm Policy with World Trade Commitments, supra note 101.
115 Id.
"6 Former USTR Agriculture Ambassador Peter Scher has called the CAP the "world's
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However, in the years following the subsidy cuts of the Freedom to Farm
Act, Congress legislated several emergency support measures for certain
commodities in the wake of agriculture commodity price crises such as those
that followed the East Asian financial crisis of 1997. " These emergency
measures, which came in the form of supplemental legislation outside the
auspices of the Freedom to Farm Act, greatly added to the United States'
AMS. In 1999 and 2000, the AMS was nearly sixty percent higher than it had
been in 1998, bringing the U.S. close to its AMS limit of $19 billion per
year.118
According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Economic Research
Service, the implication for lawmakers of this close approach to the AMS limit
is not that subsidies should be reduced, but rather that "some future programs
may need to be carefully crafted to assure they fall into an exempt category in
order to keep the AMS within the ceiling."" 9 The Farm Bill of 2002 was
"carefully crafted," passed and signed in this political and legal context. As
discussed above, Bush's signing of this legislation outraged America's trading
partners, who accused the Administration of hypocrisy and of betraying the
aims it had put forward in Doha. 0 After all, the United States itself had
insisted on placing a high priority on liberalization of agriculture in the Doha
Round."'
For the purposes of this Note, the author assumes that the Farm Bill will
keep the U.S. within (if just barely within) its AMS commitment of $19 billion
per year.' 22 In any case, the Farm Bill vastly increased subsidies for soybeans,
largest single distortion of agricultural trade." Ambassador Peter Scher, The WTO and
America's Agricultural Trade Agenda, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 3 (2000). For more
information on the CAP, see Activities of the European Union: Agriculture, EUROPA, at http://
www.europa.eu.int/pol/agr/index.-en.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2004).
.. Aligning U.S. Farm Policy with World Trade Commitments, supra note 101.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See Becker, supra note 25.
121 id.
1 There has been much consternation in the international trade community over the potential
illegality of the Farm Bill under the present WTO Agriculture Agreement. The issue will turn
on three questions: (1) whether the U.S. can classify certain aspects of the new subsidies as
"green box" instead of "amber box"; (2) whether some of the supports will be small enough to
fit under the de minimis exemptions; and (3) whether the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture could act
to stop the subsidies in the event that they approached the AMS levels. Not surprisingly, the
United States' trading partners are skeptical about all three of these questions. See Tassos
Haniotis, The New US. Farm Bill from an EU Perspective, at http://www.europa.European
Union.int/comm/agriculture/extemal/wto/usfarmbill/tassos.pdf.
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wheat and coM. 123 It resurrected subsidy regimes for honey, wool and mohair
that had been eliminated in 1996,124 and it created altogether new subsidies for
peanuts, lentils, chickpeas, and dairy products.2 5 U.S. trade officials argue
that criticism regarding the Farm Bill's potential non-compliance with the
present WTO obligations is unfounded; U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Ann
Veneman, for instance, argues that the Farm Bill does nothing more than
stabilize pre-legislation subsidy levels.2 6 The counter-cyclical price supports
that are the subject of withering criticism from the United States' trading
partners, she says, simply replace the ad hoc supplemental emergency
measures that had in recent years become a predictable part of the U.S.
agricultural economy. 2
Still, the Farm Bill constituted a strong signal from the Bush Administra-
tion that it will vigilantly guard the interests of U.S. farmers. As discussed
above in Part MII, Congress likely would not have entrusted Bush with TPA had
he not first granted farmers the protection afforded by the Farm Bill. It follows
that the political reality for U.S. trade negotiators in the Doha Round is that
they must negotiate an agreement on agriculture that gives U.S. farmers a
better deal from the government than they were getting from the market.1
2
The primary goal of the U.S. agriculture industry in international trade
negotiations is clearly to promote agricultural exports. In the words of former
USTR Agriculture Ambassador Peter Scher:
Trade liberalization creates the opportunities that our farmers and
ranchers need for growth. We must have the ability to export to
the 96 percent of humanity that lives beyond our borders. In fact,
with one in three American farm acres now producing for foreign
markets, we must export to remain profitable at home.
29
As explained above, these export-oriented goals are also in the interest of
developing countries, whose economies largely depend on agricultural exports
such as rice and sugar. It is no coincidence that the three aims of liberalization
" Aligning U.S. Farm Policy with World Trade Commitments, supra note 101.
124 id.
12 Id.
126 Id.
127 id
128 See U.S. Proposes to Cut Domestic Spending by $10 Billion, Reduce Ag Tariffs, supra
note 46.
12 Scher, supra note 116, at 2.
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stated in the Doha Declaration-significant reductions in barriers to market
access, eventual elimination of export subsidies, and significant reductions in
domestic support-all work in favor of exports from developing countries
trying to gain access to the highly protected markets of wealthy countries.
This is also the aim of U.S. exporters, who seek access to markets in Europe
and East Asia. 130
From these aims came the initial U.S. agriculture proposal, which not only
tracked the language of the Doha Declaration on each of the three pillars, but
also is the natural extension of the export-oriented TPA language of the Trade
Act of 2002. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the proposal
"would result in reductions in trade barriers for agricultural products, greater
equity in world agriculture, and expanding growth opportunities for the sale
of agricultural products."'3' The provisions of the proposal are detailed below.
This item-by-item analysis shows that the much-maligned Farm Bill of May
2002 and the highly-praised U.S. agriculture proposal of July 2002 can
peacefully coexist.'32
In the field of export competition, the United States proposed:
* Elimination of export subsidies over a five-year period. This
provision would barely affect present U.S. policy, as the U.S.
spent only $20 million on export subsidies in 2000; in contrast,
the European Union spent over $2 billion in the same year. 34
The Farm Bill contains only one minor provision that affects
export subsidies. 3 '
* Elimination of state-controlled export monopolies such as
Canada's Wheat Board. 36 The United States has none of these
so-called "state trading enterprises."' 3
33 See infra Part V.
3 U.S. Proposal, supra note 30.
132 id.
133 id.
134 id.
135 The Farm Bill revives an old program that had fallen into disuse in recent years called the
Export Enhancement Program, which provides subsidies to counter other countries' export
subsidies. Md
136 id.
137 Id.
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* Elimination of export taxes that encourage the export of
processed food products with higher value-added than raw
commodities. 3 ' An exception would be made for developing
countries that use such taxes for revenue-producing purposes.
3 1
The Farm Bill contains no export taxes.
* Establishment of rules specifically governing export credit and
insurance. 40  The United States employs some of these
devices,' 4 ' but the Farm Bill addresses none of these and adds no
new export credit programs.
* Expansion of reporting requirements in the WTO for food
aid."' The Farm Bill does not address food aid at all.
In the field of export competition, then, the U.S. proposal would have brought
major changes only in areas that do not affect U.S. policy. With the exception
of one insignificant export subsidy program, the export competition field of the
U.S. agriculture proposal would have left the Farm Bill completely undis-
turbed.
The market access provisions of the U.S. agriculture proposal followed a
similar track of minor adjustment to U.S. agriculture policy in general, and no
effect at all on the Farm Bill in particular. In the field of market access, the
United States proposed:
* Harmonization (i.e., reduction) of agricultural tariffs. The
United States proposes the so-called "Swiss formula," by which
countries with high tariffs (such as the EU and Japan) must make
far more substantial cuts than those with low tariffs (such as the
United States)."13 After a five-year phase-in period, no tariff on
any agricultural product would exceed 25 percent.1" The United
States further proposes that WTO members set a date for the
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
Id. The equation for the "Swiss formula" is as follows: TI = (TO x A)/(TO + A), where
TI is the new tariff, TO is the current tariff, and A is a standard coefficient of twenty-five. Id.
14 Id.
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eventual total abolition of all agricultural tariffs. 45 This proposal
disproportionately affects U.S. trading partners, as the world
average tariff for agricultural products is 62 percent, whereas the
U.S. average tariff for agricultural products is 12 percent."4 The
Farm Bill does not address tariffs at all.
* Expansion of tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) by twenty percent and
elimination of in-quota duties. 4" The United States maintains
TRQs for only six products,'" so the proposal would have a
minimal effect on its policy relative to that of many of its trading
partners. The Farm Bill contains no provisions regarding TRQs.
* Elimination of the special agricultural safeguard in the Agree-
ment on Agriculture. 49 U.S. trading partners have used this
safeguard far more than the United States.' ° The United States
can use it only for five products, and has not used the safeguard
"in any meaningful way" even for those products.' Again, the
Farm Bill does not address the special agricultural safeguard.
In the field of market access, then, the U.S. proposal would have disproportion-
ately affected the farm policies of U.S. trading partners. Moreover, as with the
field of export competition, the market access provisions of the U.S. agricul-
ture proposal would have left the Farm Bill completely undisturbed in all its
elements.
It is in the field of domestic support that the U.S. proposal trespassed into
the territory of the Farm Bill. However, the possibility exists for even the
much-reviled increases in "amber box" domestic support under the Farm Bill
to remain unchanged. With regard to all three types of domestic support, the
United States proposes:
145 id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
' Id. The six products are beef, dairy, peanuts, sugar, tobacco, and cotton. Id.
149 id.
0 Id.
"' Id. The five products are beef, dairy, peanuts, sugar, and cotton. Id.
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* Maintenance of present criteria for "green box" support and the
exemption of this category from countries' AMS calculations.152
Much of the U.S. domestic support regime falls under this
category, and the (much-disputed) U.S. position is that many of
the provisions of the Farm Bill are within the "green box"
exemption as well. 5 a
* Elimination of the "blue box" category of support (i.e. rolling
that category into the "amber box" of trade-distorting support). 154
The U.S. has no support programs that fall within the "blue box."
The Farm Bill contains no provisions that fall into this category.
* Reduction of "amber box" support so that no WTO member
country's trade-distorting support exceeds 5 percent of that
country's total value of agricultural production. 55 The vast
majority of WTO members are poor developing countries which
can afford only minimal, if any, programs for trade-distorting
"amber box" support.'56 Therefore, this proposal, which would
leave in place the two de minimis exemptions discussed above,
constitutes an attack on the policies of wealthy trading partners
such as the European Union and Japan, whose AMS ceilings are
far higher than that of the United States."'
As discussed above, the United States has significant "amber box" programs.
Whether these programs were increased by the Farm Bill is the subject of
contentious debate55 and is the question on which the relationship between the
U.S. agriculture proposal and the Farm Bill turns. This section will address
this question in greater detail below, but for now it is important to note simply
that this "amber box" provision of the U.S. agriculture proposal is the only
provision that bears any significant relevance to the Farm Bill.
In the field of domestic support, the U.S. proposal would again have
disproportionately affected U.S. trading partners, namely the EU and Japan.
152 Id.
' See supra note 122.
154 U.S. Proposal, supra note 30.
155 Id.
56 See generally Lichtenbaum, supra note 37.
t See infra Part V.
158 See supra note 122.
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The "green box," which is central to U.S. farm policy, would remain
unchanged. The "blue box," which is not used by the U.S., would be
eliminated altogether, becoming part of the "amber box." Therefore, the U.S.
agriculture proposal would have a significant impact only on America's
"amber box" support programs. The proposal to reduce this trade-distorting
support to five percent of a country's total value of agricultural production
would lower by almost half the United States' AMS ceiling, from the present
$19 billion per year to $10 billion per year.'59 However, the U.S. proposal
would have left the two de minimis exemptions described above completely
unchanged. With skillful legal maneuvering, these exemptions could possibly
permit the United States to maintain all of its present programs under its
proposal, even the new support measures contained in the Farm Bill.
U.S. trading partners complain that these de minimis exemptions would
make it possible for the United States to halve its AMS ceiling from $19
billion to $9.5 billion "and still spend about $30 billion.., on trade-distorting
[amber box] support.""Iw In other words, as with the export competition and
market access fields of the proposal, the domestic support provisions of the
highly-praised U.S. agriculture proposal potentially would leave the much-
maligned Farm Bill undisturbed in its entirety.
In short, the initial U.S. agriculture proposal sought deep cuts in the
protection regimes of its trading partners, thereby allowing U.S. negotiators to
strike a self-righteous tone. U.S. Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman declared
that "by putting forward this new proposal we are saying very clearly that we
want to maintain a leadership position in these negotiations and that we are
willing to make changes to our farm programs if other countries are willing to
do the same."'' However, these supposed "changes" to U.S. farm programs
could effectively leave America's subsidy regimes, including those of the
reviled Farm Bill, largely or even completely in place, while other wealthy
countries would have to undergo major revisions to their farm policies. The
U.S. proposal therefore essentially said, "We increase and keep ours, you cut
yours," giving the lie to the hubris of U.S. negotiators.
Still, this strident U.S. strategy held the potential of being successful
because of the support its export-oriented approach engendered from the bulk
of the WTO membership. The United States lost this potential for success by
"9 See Aligning U.S. Farm Policy with World Trade Commitments, supra note 101.
'60 U.S. Agriculture Proposal Criticized at WTO Market Access Talks, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Aug. 2, 2002.
161 U.S. Agriculture Proposal Receives Mixed Reviews, supra note 41.
2004] 463
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
backing off from this stance and allowing the EU to water down its proposal
in the joint compromise agriculture proposal of August 2003. As Part V will
demonstrate below, the United States and the EU are no longer the only
significant players in global trade negotiations, a fact that the September 2003
collapse in Cancun made clear. The United States may prove unable to find
an agreement that will simultaneously satisfy the demands of the Congress and
also bridge the gap between the demands of the developing world and the EU.
V. THE DOHA ROUND AND U.S. AGRICULTURE EXPORTS
Since the GATT established a global trade regime in the wake of World
War II, the United States and Europe have largely set the tone for international
trade.' 62 Now, however, "that hegemony is under challenge."' 63 Developing
countries, led by heavyweights such as Brazil and India, "feel that they were
short-changed in the Uruguay Round, and they are determined not to let that
happen again."'"' This dissatisfaction on the part of developing countries
prevented a launch of new multilateral negotiations at Seattle in 1999: "The
reason for the collapse at Seattle was [the] failure of the self-appointed
vanguard of America and Europe to respond to the concerns of developing
countries."'65
Specifically, the agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS)' 66 was a far-reaching new program that asked much of the developing
world and relatively little of wealthy members, such as the United States, the
European Union, Japan, and Canada, which had had well-developed intellec-
tual property laws in place for decades. This new regime has required heavy
implementation costs and has stretched already-thin technical and legal
resources in developing countries. "In exchange for acceptance of [the TRIPS
agreement], poor countries were meant to get a warm welcome for their
exports of labour-intensive goods such as farm products and textiles.' 6 7
162 See The TradeAgenda: A Different, New World Order, ECONOMIST, Nov. 11,2000, at 141
[hereinafter The Trade Agenda].
163 id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 See TRIPS, WoRLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
trips-e/trips-e.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
"6 The Trade Agenda, supra note 162, at 141.
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In the eight years between the completion of the Uruguay Round and the
launch of the Doha Round, though, developing countries saw little reward for
their concessions. In the words of The Economist:
Frustration with rich countries' intransigence reaches from grass-
roots protesters in Seattle. . .all the way to the top; even [former
WTO Director-General] Mike Moore [of New Zealand] bemoans
the snail's pace at which America and Europe have implemented
reforms to their markets for agriculture products and textiles.
"Sometimes I feel like joining the kids outside," he says. "When
they say the system's unfair, they're not always wrong.."168
Developing countries are still digesting the provisions of the Uruguay Round,
and having realized their new weight in the WTO, they are no longer amenable
to being pushed around. Again, in the words of The Economist:
The days when two trading blocks could set trade policy for the
world have gone .... [Instead,] it may be the emerging powers
who will increasingly take the lead. The [U.S. and the EU] will
have to get used to that if they are to preserve and strengthen the
world's multilateral trading system.'69
Curiously, it is actually the good fortune of U.S. farmers, whose export
interests coincide with those of most developing countries, that the collective
group of developing country WTO members have been so dissatisfied with the
Uruguay Round. This dissatisfaction manifests itself in concrete demands for
liberalization of global agriculture trade, which is precisely what U.S.
agriculture exporters want. Though the breadth of issues at play in the Doha
Round is vast--competition policy, services, manufactured goods, textiles,
anti-dumping and countervailing duties, and of course agriculture are among
the areas of possible negotiation 7°-agriculture is the "centrepiece of the Doha
Round."' 7' "If we don't have major reform in agriculture, I don't think we will
successfully close the round," says Sergio Marchi, Canada's ambassador to the
16 id.
169 Id.
170 See Doha Declaration, supra note 4.
1 Europe's Meagre Harvest, supra note 5.
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WTO. 172 This political reality plays into the hands of U.S. demands for new
export opportunities for its agriculture market, because the TPA lan-
guage-which, as discussed above, requires the president to seek export
opportunities for U.S. farmers-also encapsulates the agriculture interests of
developing countries. In fact, the TPA language (and the U.S. agriculture
proposal that sprang from it) is favorable to virtually all members of the WTO
except for Japan and the EU. To win support for their agriculture proposals,
the U.S., the EU, and Japan will have to compete for the favor of developing
countries, which make up approximately three-quarters of the membership of
the WTO.
From the beginning, Japan has assumed a position that is mostly defensive,
claiming that the "aggressive"' U.S. proposal had put the Doha Round
agriculture negotiations at risk because it called for steep reductions in the
protection of the agriculture industry of some members (namely, the EU and
Japan).I74 Japan complains that the United States' proposed use of the "Swiss
formula" of tariff reductions, 71which would cut high tariffs more substantially
than low tariffs, would "erase" some forms of agriculture from the world.
76
Therefore, Japan urged that the "Uruguay Round formula" for tariff reduction,
which provides for percentage reductions in countries' tariffs, should be used
in the Doha Round, lest there be no agreement at all: "There is no middle
ground between the Uruguay Round formula and the Swiss formula."'"
Hiderori Murakami, Japan's Director General of Agricultural Affairs, said that
the U.S. and members of the Cairns Group of agriculture-exporting countries
(which, as discussed in Part II received the U.S. agriculture proposal
favorably) must "come to their senses."'
Japan's own proposal found no enthusiasts in the developing world. While
it did perfunctorily address the three pillars of agricultural trade-export
competition, market access, and domestic support-it contained no specific
numbers whatsoever. For the first pillar, export competition, Japan proposed
that export subsidies be reduced, but called for no specific percentage nor
172 WTO Official Says U.S., EU Must Give Ground to Avoid Cancun Overload, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Jan. 17, 2003, at 14.
"' Japan Official Blames U.S. for Possible Spring Agricultural Stalemate, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Nov. 22, 2002, at 1 [hereinafter Japan Official Blames U.S.].
174 Id.
175 See supra note 143.
176 Japan Official Blames U.S., supra note 173.
177 Id.
178 Id.
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quantity of reduction.'79 Regarding market access, Japan proposed reducing
tariff rates by an average percentage, as opposed to the U.S.-proposed Swiss
formula. 80 Again, the percentage of reduction would be determined later as
negotiations continue. 8 ' In the arena of domestic support, Japan proposed that
"amber box" subsidies be reduced in the aggregate, as opposed to crop-by-
crop, but again the proposal stated no percentage of reduction or proposed
amount of reduction.8 2 The Japanese proposal was remarkable only for its
vagueness.
Despite this vagueness, though, the Japanese proposal does show Japan's
awareness of the importance of making concessions to developing countries.
The proposal courts developing countries by allowing more flexibility in
implementation periods and reduction rates on all three pillars.8 3 Moreover,
the least-developed countries would be exempt from reductions altogether. 18
Still, with no specific numbers to analyze, developing countries find it difficult
to support the Japanese proposal.
Given Japan's failure to engage meaningfully in the ongoing agriculture
negotiations, the successful conclusion of a new agreement on agriculture will
hinge on the ability of the United States and the EU to reach consensus. Here,
too, the onus seems to be on the EU: "It is well known that the prospects for
freeing farm trade... depend largely on the European Union. The [Doha]
Round can succeed only if Europe agrees to deep reductions of its huge, trade-
distorting agricultural subsidies."'8 5 EU Agriculture Commissioner Franz
Fischler agrees that if the EU fails to come up with a compelling plan for
liberalization of global agriculture markets, it "deserves to be called a political
dwarf.'
186
The EU regained momentum in the negotiations in early 2003 with its own
agriculture proposal, which Fischler said "put [the EU] in a real leadership
position in the WTO talks."' 8'  The proposal, which, as EU negotiators
recognize, must be attractive to developing countries to have any chance of
179 Id.
1o Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
18 Europe's Meagre Harvest, supra note 5, at 70.
186 Id.
817 European Union States Approve Offer on Doha Agriculture in WTO's Doha Round,
BUREAU NAT'L AFF. TRADE DAILY, Jan. 28, 2003, at A8.
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success, "would slash tariffs, deeply cut trade-distorting domestic support and
even eliminate export subsidies to developing countries for selected commodi-
ties. ' This initial EU proposal put forth specific and significant reductions
in each of the three pillars.
For the first pillar, export competition, the EU proposed an average cut of
forty-five percent on export subsidies, with the possibility of elimination of
export subsidies for wheat, oilseeds, olive oil, and tobacco exported to
developing countries. 9 In contrast, as detailed above, the original U.S.
proposal called for eventual elimination of all export subsidies.'90 Developing
countries, which generally are too poor to employ export subsidies, 9 ' complain
that the EU proposal to reduce export subsidies by less than fifty percent fell
far short of "the Doha mandate's call for 'reductions of, with a view to phasing
out' export subsidies."'
The EU's proposal regarding the second pillar, market access, centered
around a thirty-six percent average reduction to agricultural tariffs. 93 This
proposal would allow WTO members, including the EU, to maintain protection
for certain sensitive crops by keeping relatively high tariff levels on those
crops while compensating with deeper tariff cuts in other crop sectors." In
contrast, as detailed above, the initial U.S. proposal would allow no tariff on
any single product to exceed twenty-five percent and called for WTO members
to set a date for the eventual abolition of all tariffs on agricultural products.
Like Japan, the EU proposed using the Uruguay Round formula of tariff
reduction, 9 which provides for equal percentage cuts for all WTO members,
rather than the "Swiss formula," which, as explained above, would entail
disproportionately high cuts for those countries whose tariffs are dispropor-
tionately high. The EU argued that the Uruguay Round formula would "ensure
'burden sharing' among developing countries and would avoid drawbacks of
the Swiss formula for developing countries that have higher tariffs."'"
188 Commission Unveils Ag Proposal; Seeks Clearance from Member States, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Dec. 20,2002, at 1.
189 European Commission Ag Proposal Shows Strategic Move on WTO Talks, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Dec. 20, 2002, at 1 [hereinafter European Commission Ag Proposal].9 See U.S. Proposal, supra note 30.
1 See generally Lichtenbaum, supra note 37.
192 European Commission Ag Proposal, supra note 189.
193 Id.
19 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
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Finally, regarding the third pillar, domestic support, the EU proposed a
fifty-five percent reduction in the trade-distorting "amber box" category of
subsidies. 97 In contrast, as detailed above, the U.S. proposal would have
required WTO members with higher trade-distorting subsidy levels to make
deeper cuts in their subsidy programs. The EU proposal would limit its own
"amber box" subsidies at approximately $30 billion per year and would cap the
United States' "amber box" support at around $10 billion per year, whereas the
U.S. proposal would bring those annual ceilings down to $11 billion and $10
billion, respectively.'" The EU also proposed eliminating the de minimis
exemptions that the U.S. has used in the past to exclude billions of dollars'
worth of domestic support from its tally of allowable support. Still, the
aggregate reduction of the developed world's agriculture subsidies would be
far greater under the initial U.S. proposal than under that of the European
Union, so on this pillar, too, developing countries logically favored the U.S.
proposal.
In any case, the EU's "long-awaited"'" agriculture proposal showed a
desire on the part of the EU to "end its role as an outcast in multilateral
agricultural negotiations and to attract the support of developing countries,
splitting them from the Cairns Group."'  To attract developing countries to
the EU's position, its proposal promised them "specific advantages in terms of
market access, domestic supports and a selective elimination of export
subsidies for commodities sold to developing countries."' In addition to the
provisions of the proposal that address the three pillars, the proposal also
called for wealthy countries to guarantee that at least half of their total
agricultural imports come from developing countries. 2 Further, it called for
all wealthy countries to join the EU' s "Everything But Arms" initiative, which
provides unlimited duty-free access for imports from the poorest of developing
countries. 203
Developing countries were fully aware they were being courted. "It's a kind
of divide and rule [strategy]. Right now the EU is negotiating against the
197 Id.
198 Id.
'99 Id.
' d.
200 Id.
201 id.
2 Id.
203 Id. For information on the "Everything But Arms" initiative, see European Union Trade
and Development, at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/devel/eba htm (last visited Mar.
4, 2004).
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world," said one developing country negotiator of the initial European Union
proposal. 21 "The question is now whether or not developing country members
of the Cairns group would move away from their current position. '"205
Developing country members criticized the EU proposal as being "designed to
protect the European Union's most sensitive commodities with average tariff
reductions, domestic subsidy cuts and by proposing targeted export subsidy
cuts for wheat and oilseeds., '2' 6 The proposal calls for a reduction in aggregate
export subsidies, which would allow the European Union actually to increase
export subsidies for certain products.2"7 Developing countries are not fooled:
"If they say the U.S. proposal is self-serving, this is even worse," commented
a negotiator from a developing country member of the Cairns Group.208
In early 2003, after both the U.S. and the EU proposals had been aired, it
appeared unlikely that the two trading powers would reach a consensus, given
their then "diametrically opposed positions." 20 9  According to Stuart
Harbinson, chairman of the WTO's negotiating group on agriculture, "If
everyone remains camped on their current positions, the prospects for
negotiations are not encouraging."210 As described in Part II above,2 ' though,
the United States and the European Union did not remain camped on their
positions. In August of 2003, just weeks before the important WTO Ministe-
204 European Commission Ag Proposal, supra note 189.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 id.
208 Id.
209 U.S., EU Signal Unwillingness to Compromise on Agriculture Talks, INSIDEU.S. TRADE,
Jan. 10, 2003, at 1. Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Agriculture Jim Murphy stated at
a January 8, 2002 forum sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies that
because of "intense political pressure from the agriculture community and U.S. lawmakers," the
United States could not and would not give ground on its demands that "WTO members with
higher tariffs and more domestic subsidies than the U.S. reduce their tariffs and subsidies
disproportionately." Preserving the present system, in which the European Union is allowed
significantly higher tariffs and subsidies than the United States, is simply "not in the cards,"
Murphy continued. "If the bottom line is to achieve an equitable outcome, the biggest sinners
are going to have to do more." Congressman Charles Stenholm of Texas, a ranking member of
the House Agriculture Committee, was more blunt in expressing his "shock" over the European
Union's intransigence: "[T]hat won't get us anywhere. That dog won't hunt." At the very same
forum, though, European Union Agriculture Counselor Gerard Keily countered that the
European Union "could not drop its approach of an equal cut in agricultural subsidies and tariffs
for all WTO members." Id.
210 Harbinson Disappointed with Latest RoundofWTOAg Talks, Promises Modalities Draft,
supra note 94, at A3.
21 See generally supra Part II.
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rial Meeting in Cancun at which WTO members hoped to substantially
advance the Doha Round negotiations, particularly on the issue of agriculture,
the U.S. and the EU came to a compromise agreement on agriculture.212 This
joint proposal was significantly less ambitious on all three pillars of agricul-
tural negotiations--domestic support, market access, and export subsi-
dies-than the initial U.S. agriculture proposal.213 As such, it was roundly
criticized by developing countries and Cairns Group members alike.2" 4
While the United States found common ground with the EU on agriculture
in this August 2003 compromise, the climb-down from the trade-liberalizing
ambition of its initial proposal set the stage for the September collapse in
Cancun. Led by India and Brazil, a coalition of over twenty developing
countries walked out of the negotiations, primarily over the issue of agricul-
ture.2" 5 This Note contends that the collapse at Cancun was due to the failure
of the United States to remain true to the export-oriented guidance contained
in the TPA, which the bulk of the membership of the WTO had supported.
VI. CONCLUSION
The language of the TPA pertaining to agriculture is the key to any hope of
success for the Doha Round. The TPA language shaped the initial U.S.
agriculture proposal in accordance with the Doha Declaration (and also in
accordance with the export-oriented interests of the developing world and the
vast majority of the membership of the WTO). If the members can reach a
consensus that accommodates the language of these documents, the Doha
Round stands a good chance of being a success. If not, it will be difficult to
salvage the round from failure.
There is an umbilical link between the support from the U.S. farm lobby for
the initial U.S. agriculture proposal and the language and intent of the TPA
section of the Trade Act of 2002, and in turn between the TPA and the export-
friendly agriculture proposal. This Note has argued that the TPA legislation
would have failed without the protection offered to the U.S. agricultural sector
by the Farm Bill. It follows that any trade agreement negotiated by the
president will not gain congressional approval unless it offers provisions
favorable to that same sector. The farm lobby, and the members of Congress
212 See Meller, supra note 42.
213 U.S., EU Offer Ag Negotiating Framework, supra note 43.
214 id.
215 See Becker, supra note 44.
20041
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
from states in which that lobby is powerful, will not approve an agreement that
does not provide U.S. farmers with a better deal from the international market
than the deal they are presently getting from the U.S. government." 6
When the United States seeks "market access," then, it means lower tariffs
in Europe, Japan, and the developing world. When the United States seeks
elimination of export subsidies, it points the finger directly at wealthy trading
partners such as the EU and Japan, the only countries that employ these
programs. Finally, when the United States seeks reductions in domestic
support, it means reductions in the domestic support regimes of the EU and
Japan. U.S. farmers believe that if European and Japanese farmers were not
so heavily subsidized, the huge European and Japanese markets for food and
produce would beg for agricultural imports, which would come from, among
other places, the United States.
Fortunately for the United States, the developing world agrees on each of
these three pillars. For its part, the United States hopes to keep its domestic
support regime, even the new programs contained in the Farm Bill of 2002,
largely in place. It seeks to liberalize world agriculture trade by having it both
ways: keeping the Farm Bill and, with the help of developing country allies,
forcing its trading partners to accept the U.S. export-friendly agriculture
proposal. U.S. farmers do indeed want a better return from the market than
they are now getting from the government, but if possible, they would like to
continue reaping the harvest of subsidies even after the Doha Round has
liberalized global agriculture trade.
The collapse at Cancun showed that the most important allies the United
States has in the Doha Round are the agriculture exporting countries of the
developing world and the Cairns Group. These countries share the interests
that are captured legally in the congressional TPA guidance of the Trade Act
of 2002. When the United States strayed too far from that guidance in August
2003 with its compromise agreement with the EU, the Doha Round collapsed.
Finding its way back to the path set by the TPA guidance is the only way the
United States can fulfill the promise of agriculture negotiations in the Doha
Round. If the members of the WTO fail to find an agreement that follows that
guidance, the Doha Round will provide a barren harvest for farmers in both the
United States and the developing world.
216 See text accompanying supra note 46.
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